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ABSTRACT 
 
This article aims to consider the relevancy of (i) cap-and-trade schemes and (ii) carbon tax 
schemes in a developing economy context.  Even though both schemes have a common goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, they operate very differently, each with their own set of 
advantages and disadvantages. Sustainable developments comprise various elements categorised 
in three primary dimensions – environmental, economic and social.  The objective of reducing 
greenhouse gases via the implementation of carbon tax or cap-and-trade schemes primarily 
addresses the environmental dimension of sustainable development.  Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned, the impact of both schemes on the economically sustainable development, 
including industry competitiveness and growth, still has to be determined.  In South Africa, the 
National Treasury made a decision to implement carbon tax as opposed to cap-and-trade 
schemes.  In this article, the reasoning behind their decision in favour of carbon tax in the South 
African context is critically considered, firstly by evaluating the key characteristics between cap-
and-trade and carbon tax schemes and secondly by considering the effectiveness hereof in the 
global context.  It was found primary reason behind the favourable consideration of carbon tax 
was the fact the implementation thereof would be ‘simpler’ using the existing taxation systems, 
whereas cap-and-trade would require the implementation of sophisticated mechanisms that may 
not provide the optimum benefit in a developing economy context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 
he issue of global warming in recent years has been at the forefront of not only the scientific 
community, but also of various governmental institutions (Ren & Lin, 2001). Many scientists are of 
the opinion that higher concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions, such as carbon dioxide and 
methane, can negatively affect our climate (Sathiendrakumar, 2003) and that if the atmospheric concentrations of 
these greenhouse gases continue to rise, the global climate will become increasingly warmer (Yusuf et al., 2012; 
Ren & Lin, 2001). Shepherd (2012:1) is in agreement herewith when saying that the climate change currently being 
experienced is due to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions that arise from human activities, such as the burning 
of fossil fuels, agriculture and deforestation. Spectral calculations also confirm that water vapour accounts for 
approximately 87% of the greenhouse effect and a doubling of the current level of carbon dioxide emissions would 
result in a rise in global temperatures of 0.51°C without water feedback (Ollila, 2012). In South Africa, the level of 
carbon emissions per unit of economic output was nearly three times the average set by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Goldblatt & Davies, 2002). 
 
 
T 
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Governments considering strategies for lowering carbon emissions ordinarily have two basic approaches to 
consider, namely i) a cap-and-trade scheme that reduces emissions by limiting the quantity of carbon dioxide that 
can be emitted and then allocating emissions permits that are tradable, or ii) introducing a carbon tax scheme that 
effectively raises the price of fossil fuels based on their carbon content (Anon, 2012). The cap-and-trade approach 
has its foundation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that was 
established with the goal of reducing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, to which South 
Africa became a signatory in August 1997 (UNFCCC, 2004). In a cap-and-trade scheme, a governmental 
organisation typically issues a license (or permit) to pollute to major industries with the entity then being in position 
to trade these permits with another entity who might make ‘equivalent’ changes more cost effectively (Gilbertson & 
Reyes, 2009). This is the approach underlying most emission trading schemes with the underlying theory that the 
available supply of permits will be slowly reduced, so that the market retains its value while at the same time forcing 
a decrease in the overall level of greenhouse gas emissions (Gilbertson & Reyes 2009). On the other hand, carbon 
tax is in essence an excise tax on the producers of raw fossil fuels based on the relative carbon content of those fuels 
(OECD, 1997). The objective of carbon tax is therefore to control the problem of global warming caused by 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, which then, per se, include carbon (Pearson & Smith, 1991). The 
impact of carbon tax is ordinarily determined by using the energy demand function that considers the price elasticity 
of energy (Yamaguchi, 2007). According to SBS (2012), carbon tax schemes have been implemented in many 
countries around the world, including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Costa Rica and China. 
 
Sustainable development 
 
From the above it is evident that both cap-and-trade schemes and carbon tax schemes intended to effect 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in order to contribute to sustainable development. According to Mohammed 
(2011), sustainable development has been defined as that which is required to harmonise the fulfilment of human 
needs with the protection of the natural environment so that these needs can be met not only in the present, but also 
in the indefinite future. Sustainable development comprises various elements categorised into three primary 
dimensions, namely environmental, economic and social, which in essence is the so-called triple bottom line, which 
has been defined as the balance within the concept of sustainability (Cronje & Chenga, 2009; Anon, 2006; Newport 
et al., 2003): 
 
 The economic dimension of sustainability is important as critical issues such as costs associated with 
environmental pollution, constraints on economic growth and the destruction of non-renewable resources 
are addressed by this area of sustainable development. 
 With regard to social sustainability, it is suggested that the social dimension of sustainable development 
encompasses the transformation, and perpetual improvement of the livelihoods of human beings within a 
specific social context. 
 In terms of environmental sustainability, clean air and water, reduced toxic emissions and reducing 
household waste as well as conserving natural resources are among the important environmental policy 
objectives that most OECD governments have been pursuing over the past thirty years. 
 
The South African context 
 
In terms of related carbon emission developments in South Africa, the National Treasury published a 
discussion document considering the economic merits for introducing a carbon tax in South Africa in December 
2010 (National Treasury, 2010). This elicited 79 stakeholder responses, with a more detailed policy document 
containing the design of the carbon tax anticipated to be released in due course (WWF, 2012). 
 
However, prior to this, on 1 September 2010, a carbon emission tax on the sale of new passenger motor 
vehicles in South Africa was implemented, which added a tax of R75 for every gram of carbon dioxide per 
kilometre it emits over the 120g/km (NAAMSA, 2011; Shirley, 2010). These vehicles are taxed on carbon dioxide 
emissions above 120g/km at a fixed rate of ZAR75 per g/km. Therefore, if a new passenger car emits 200g/km of 
carbon dioxide, it will be taxed on the 80g/km emitted above the 120g/km threshold. At the suggested flat rate of 
ZAR75 per g/km, such a vehicle will attract carbon tax of around ZAR 6 000 (Finnern, 2010). In terms of the 
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industry’s contribution to sustainable development in the region, it contributed approximately 7.5% to the country’s 
GDP in 2008 (SAI, 2008a). Therefore, due to its importance to the South African economy, the impact of hereof is 
expected to be significant. The National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) 
suggested that carbon tax will inflate vehicle prices by as much as 2%, which may lower sales volumes and could 
negatively impact vehicle industry employment levels (Anon, 2010). 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Following from the above, the question may be asked as to the total impact of the implementation of carbon 
tax as an environmental policy, not only in the context of the South African vehicle industry, but also in the context 
of the broader economy. In light hereof, the primary research question under consideration could be formulated as 
follows: 
 
 Is the carbon tax mechanism the most appropriate mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within 
the South African developing economy context, seen in the light of global experiences? 
 
In consideration hereof, this paper aims to examine firstly the distinguishing natures of i) cap-and-trade 
schemes and ii) carbon tax schemes, and secondly to provide an evaluation of the decision made by the National 
Treasury to implement carbon tax in South Africa. The research is based on an analytical literature study research 
methodology and utilises a three-step approach in considering whether carbon tax is the most appropriate 
mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa. Firstly, the key distinguishing features between the 
carbon tax and cap-and-trade mechanisms are analysed, secondly, the effectiveness of these scheme are evaluated 
based on global experiences and thirdly an evaluation of the National Treasury’s case for carbon tax is provided. 
 
KEY FEATURES OF CAP-AND-TRADE AND CARBON TAX SCHEMES 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Goldblatt (2010a), the primary distinguishing features of cap-and-trade and carbon tax 
schemes are typically threefold, namely: 
 
 In terms of carbon pricing, carbon tax offers some level of certainty as the price is fixed; whereas with a 
cap-and-trade approach, the carbon price is uncertain and is subject to market volatility. 
 In terms of achieving quantitative limits of carbon emissions, the cap-and-trade approach appears to be able 
to accomplish this more effectively than carbon tax as emissions are capped and therefore provide some 
level of certainty of the environmental outcome. 
 In terms of administrative costs, the carbon tax approach may be seen as a more efficient option as its 
implementation can be executed within the infrastructure of the existing tax administration, whereas the 
cap-and-trade approach may require the creation of a new institution to implement a trading scheme. 
 
The distinctive characteristics of these two approaches are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Cap-and-trade schemes 
 
The foundation of the cap-and-trade methodology originated with C Boyden Gray who talked about 
cleaning up the environment by letting people buy and sell rights to pollute (Smithsonian, 2009). This concept was 
initially termed emissions trading, but was subsequently changed to cap and trade. In a cap-and-trade scheme, 
quantitative limits are set on the time path for greenhouse gas emissions of different countries with these countries 
then administering these limits in their own fashion. These schemes typically allow for the transfer of emission 
allowances between the different countries under the Kyoto Protocol (Noordhaus, 2007). With regard to cap- and-
trade schemes in South Africa, it should be noted that South Africa signed the protocol in 2002, and even though it 
has no commitment to cap emissions, it is involved in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects (DEAT 
2010). Some of the key (negative) characteristics of cap-and-trade schemes include the following: 
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 There may be initial over-allocation permits to governments or companies resulting in no required 
behavioural change by companies regarding carbon emissions (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). 
 In some instances, producers may be able to transfer abatement costs to consumers and increase its prices 
without consideration of the true purposes of the scheme (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). 
 There are major administrative complexities related to cap-and-trade schemes together with uncertainties 
with regard to the actual economic costs to business (National Treasury, 2010). 
 
A further issue is the concept of carbon leakage, which is said to occur when there is an increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions in one country as a result of emission reductions in another country that has stricter 
climate change policies (CLC, 2010). The results of studies conducted on the effects of the Kyoto Protocol have 
shown carbon leakage to be in the range of 5 to 20% using static Computable General Equilibrium models, which 
differs from the opinion of researchers who say, in practice, carbon leakage is not substantial due to transport costs 
and local market conditions (Barker et al., 2007). The principles of the cap-and-trade approach, however, have 
indicated some positive aspects, including the following: 
 
 Trade schemes implemented in air pollution programmes in the United States reported a strong positive 
effect on reducing emissions (Tietenburg, 2003). 
 The performance of cap-and-trade schemes in the field of improving environmental sustainability was 
assessed using a simulation model at the University of Saskatchewan, where it was revealed that it 
decreased carbon dioxide emissions and increased environmental and economic sustainability (Belcher et 
al., 2003). 
 
Carbon tax 
 
Carbon tax, which was first introduced in Europe in the early 1990s, has been widely advocated as a means 
for reducing such emissions to address anthropogenic climate change (Clarke, 2011). In principle, carbon taxes are 
levied at the same specific rate on all emissions, irrespective of their source. Since carbon emissions have a 
proportional relationship to fossil fuel usage, this could be charged directly on emissions of fossil fuels such petrol, 
gas and coal (IMF, 2008). In addition to the advantages of price certainty and lower administrative costs, carbon tax 
offers the advantage of economy-wide application in terms of coverage in comparison to cap-and-trade schemes that 
ordinarily only cover high emitters in the initial phases (Goldblatt, 2010a). Another advantage is that pricing 
systems such as carbon tax are less susceptible to corruption than quantity type systems, with this being 
demonstrated frequently at international trade interventions when quotas are compared to tariffs (Noordhaus, 2007). 
A further significant advantage, according to Pope and Owen (2009), is the suggestion that it would provide a more 
stable revenue base over time. They propose (within the Australian context) that it may generate around A$11.5 
billion per annum, subject to various treasury assumptions (Pope & Owen, 2009). 
 
In terms of disadvantages, carbon tax schemes do not ensure quantifiable, emission reductions (National 
Treasury, 2010). This assumption is supported by the simulation model developed at the University of 
Saskatchewan, which revealed that carbon tax had no significant effect on carbon dioxide emissions or 
environmental sustainability, but may rather decrease economic sustainability (Belcher et al., 2003). Another 
possible significant disadvantage is the pricing of carbon. The social cost of carbon has been defined as the 
monetary damage done by emitting one more ton of carbon at some point in time. Using quantitative modelling, a 
marginal cost of £100 per ton of carbon has been noted in the United Kingdom (Pearce, 2003). Ideally, the carbon 
tax price should be priced to cover the marginal cost per ton of carbon, with the resultant question then being 
whether the carbon tax price accurately reflects the monetary damage caused by an additional ton of carbon? 
 
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH SCHEMES 
 
Cap-and-trade schemes 
 
In terms of cap and trade, the European Union Environmental Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world's 
largest emissions permit market to date and is organised into distinctive periods referred to as ‘phases’, with Phase I 
between 2005 and 2007 and Phase II between 2008 and 2012 (Hintermann, 2012). In terms of the effectiveness 
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hereof in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, a sample study of 2101 European firms subject to the EU ETS 
revealed that it led to reductions in emissions in both phases (Abrell et al., 2011). 
 
In respect of Phase I, an analysis of carbon dioxide emissions by countries subject to the EU ETS (Table 1 
below) found an overall net increase of 1.88% in GHG emissions, with 11 out of the 24 countries recording 
decreases in their carbon emissions. 
 
Table 1: Phase I: Emissions of EU ETS countries (tons of carbon) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 % change 
Austria 33,372,826 32 382 804 31 751 165 -4.86 
Belgium 55,363,223 54 775 314 52 795 318 -4.64 
Cyprus 5,078,866 5 259 273 5 396 164 6.25 
Czech Republic 82,454,618 83 624 953 87 834 758 6.52 
Germany 474,990,760 478 016 581 487 004 055 2.53 
Denmark 26,475,718 34 199 588 29 407 355 11.07 
Estonia 12,621,817 12 109 278 15 329 931 21.46 
Spain 183,626,981 179 711 225 186 495 894 1.56 
Finland 33,099,625 44 621 411 42 541 327 28.53 
France 131,263,787 126 979 048 126 634 806 -3.53 
Greece 71,267,736 69 965 145 72 717 006 2.03 
Hungary 26,161,627 25 845 891 26 835 478 2.58 
Ireland 22,441,000 21 705 328 21 246 117 -5.32 
Italy 225,989,357 227 439 408 226 368 773 0.17 
Lithuania 6,603,869 6 516 911 5 998 744 -9.16 
Luxembourg 2,603,349 2 712 972 2 567 231 -1.39 
Latvia 2,854,481 2 940 680 2 849 203 -0.18 
Netherlands 80,351,288 76 701 184 79 874 658 -0.59 
Poland 203,149,562 209 616 285 209 601 993 3.18 
Portugal 36,425,915 33 083 871 31 183 076 -14.39 
Sweden 19,381,623 19 884 147 15 348 209 -20.81 
Slovenia 8,720,548 8 842 181 9 048 633 3.76 
Slovakia 25,231,767 25 543 239 24 516 830 -2.83 
United Kingdom 242,513,099 251 159 840 256 581 160 5.80 
Total 2,012,043,453 2 033 636 557 2 049 927 884 1.88 
Source: Anon (2008b) 
 
In respect of Phase II (Table 2 below), all the countries reported reductions in carbon emissions, with an 
overall reduction of 7.2% 
 
From a review of the above tables it is clear that the EU ETS was more effective in Phase II than in Phase I. 
It is, however, argued that Phase I not only established a carbon price for material sectors of economic activity in 
Europe, but also established the necessary trading infrastructure (Convery et al., 2008). Furthermore, during Phase I, 
the permits allocated were also found to be consistently higher than the actual verified emissions taking place in the 
EU ETS countries (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). 
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Table 2: Phase II: Emissions of EU ETS countries (tons of carbon) 
Country 2008 2009 % change 
Austria 68 232 000 62 313 000 -8.67 
Belgium 104 865 000 103 593 000 -1.21 
Cyprus 8 555 000 8 199 000 -4.16 
Czech Republic 116 952 000 108 121 000 -7.55 
Germany 786 652 000 734 599 000 -6.62 
Denmark 46 850 000 45 698 000 -2.46 
Estonia 18 383 000 15 951 000 -13.23 
Spain 329 286 000 288 230 000 -12.47 
Finland 56 083 000 53 568 000 -4.48 
France 376 993 000 363 356 000 -3.62 
Greece 97 817 000 94 917 000 -2.96 
Hungary 54 653 000 48 676 000 -10.94 
Ireland 43 406 000 41 642 000 -4.06 
Italy 447 367 000 400 836 000 -10.40 
Lithuania 15 130 000 12 838 000 -15.15 
Luxembourg 10 660 000 10 143 000 -4.85 
Latvia 7 591 000 6 652 000 -12.37 
Netherlands 173 845 000 169 650 000 -2.41 
Poland 316 059 000 298 905 000 -5.43 
Portugal 58 357 000 57 400 000 -1.64 
Sweden 49 105 000 43 744 000 -10.92 
Slovenia 17 158 000 15 291 000 -10.88 
Slovakia 37 557 000 33 890 000 -9.76 
United Kingdom 522 247 000 474 579 000 -9.13 
Total 3 763 803 000 3 492 791 000 -7.20 
Source: UN (2011) 
 
Carbon tax 
 
Various studies around the world have been conducted using simulations to determine the estimated impact 
of carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions, such as the following: 
 
 In a study estimating the impact of carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions in Nepal using an energy 
system model, it was confirmed that the introduction of carbon tax would result in an estimated reduction 
of 12% under certain conditions (Shakya et al., 2012). 
 A study estimating the effect of policy instruments such as carbon tax in Austria on the passenger motor 
vehicles confirmed that policy measures may demonstrate an effective reduction in GHG emissions (Kloess 
& Muller, 2011). 
 In terms of the actual effectiveness of the tax in reducing greenhouse gases, studies conducted in Norway, 
one of the first countries to introduce carbon tax in 1991, revealed that carbon emissions increased by 19% 
from 1990 to 1999 as opposed to a GDP growth of 35% in the same period, which pointed to an overall 
reduction in average emission per unit GDP of 12% (Bruvoll & Larson, 2004). 
 In Sweden, an ex-post evaluation of the implementation of carbon tax for the years 1992 to 1995 shows 
mixed results of the effect of the carbon tax on carbon emissions according to different industries affected 
by the tax, and also revealed that even though the services sector, household and transport sectors reported 
no change in emission levels, there was a positive effect on carbon emission levels (Bohlin, 1998). 
 In both the Netherlands and Denmark, tax exemptions were provided for the manufacturing industry and 
related energy intensive industries, and this reduced the mitigating effects of carbon tax in these countries 
(Lin & Li, 2012). 
 Carbon tax on passenger motor vehicles was introduced in Ireland in 2008, and a study estimating the 
effect of the tax on greenhouse gas emissions revealed that it should result in a decline in greenhouse gas 
emissions of 0.2milllions tons of carbon by 2015 (Hennessy & Toll, 2011). 
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 An analysis of the implementation of a potential carbon tax in Washington using a Carbon Tax Analysis 
Model revealed that a carbon tax at US$30 per metric ton of carbon dioxide lowers GHG emissions by 
8.4% (Keibun, 2011). 
 
Effects of cap-and-trade and carbon tax on industry 
 
In terms of the economic effect of cap-and-trade schemes on profit, employment and value added, a firm-
based study of the EU ETS revealed that in Phase I and the beginning of Phase II, the EU ETS did not materially 
affect profits, employment and value added (Abrell et al., 2011). An interim analysis of Phase I of the EU ETS 
confirms that the first phase had little impact on industry competitiveness (Convery et al., 2008). Table 3 below 
summarises the GDP per capita information (adjusted for current prices) for each EU ETS country in the period 
2005 to 2009. With the exception of the United Kingdom, all countries reported a real increase in economic growth 
during the period, with the aggregate economic output growing in real terms by 21%. This mitigates any argument 
that cap-and-trade schemes will result in decreased profits and growth for companies and industries alike. 
 
Table 3: EU ETS countries: GDP per capita (US dollars at current prices) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % change 
Austria 37 048 39 278 45 133 49 650 45 614 23 
Belgium 36 225 38 167 43 586 47 822 44 356 22 
Cyprus 22 298 23 876 27 686 31 693 29 277 31 
Czech Republic 12 726 14 463 17 499 21 723 18 789 48 
Denmark 47 546 50 412 56 941 62 115 55 915 18 
Estonia 10 330 12 506 16 375 17 773 14 337 39 
Finland 37 302 39 460 46 523 51 153 45 062 21 
France 34 002 35 669 40 586 44 245 40 773 20 
Germany 33 514 35 169 40 281 43 937 40 029 19 
Greece 21 468 23 357 27 088 30 216 28 411 32 
Hungary 10 937 11 181 13 553 15 390 12 660 16 
Ireland 48 888 52 922 60 578 60 570 50 564 3 
Italy 30 299 31 539 35 569 38 344 35 041 16 
Latvia 6 913 8 658 12 557 14 729 11 433 65 
Lithuania 7 641 8 900 11 636 14 153 11 075 45 
Luxembourg 82 370 91 395 107 863 118 673 104 384 27 
Netherlands 39 157 41 378 47 591 52 766 47 915 22 
Poland 7 963 8 949 11 132 13 852 11 256 41 
Portugal 18 132 19 008 21 846 23 689 21 976 21 
Slovakia 8 844 10 290 13 803 17 348 16 026 81 
Slovenia 17 840 19 406 23 507 27 058 24 235 36 
Spain 26 044 28 052 32 327 35 306 32 080 23 
Sweden 41 042 43 899 50 485 52 632 43 347 6 
United Kingdom 37 881 40 381 46 191 43 022 35 220 -7 
Total 676 410 728 315 850 336 927 859 819 775 21 
Source: UN (2012) 
 
The effect of carbon tax on certain industries has also been subject to empirical research. 
 
 In a study of energy intensive industries, 21 OECD countries between 1992 and 2008 revealed that carbon 
tax had a positive influence on the international competitiveness of energy intensive industries in export 
countries (Zhao, 2011). An important point to note is that carbon tax has important implications in terms of 
global competitiveness of economies and even though global competitiveness may not be reduced over the 
long term by higher energy prices, the short-term effects of a carbon tax may be serious for certain 
industries (Zhang & Baranzini, 2004). 
 In Sweden, the implementation of carbon tax has had no effect in terms of economic efficiencies in the 
transport, household and service sectors; however, carbon tax accounted for $1,6 billion of government 
revenue in 1995 (Bohlin, 1998). 
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 The implementation of excise tax on passenger motor vehicles (based on emission levels rather than engine 
size) in Ireland is expected to result in a decrease in fiscal revenue by up to half a billion euro in 2025 
(Hennessy & Toll, 2011). 
 
AN EVALUATION OF NATIONAL TREASURY’S CASE FOR CARBON TAX 
 
Considering the above, within the South African context, it was not disputed that cap-and-trade schemes 
could achieve the same objectives as carbon taxes. National Treasury did, however, argue that cap-and-trade 
schemes brought specific challenges to the South African context. These include the i) credibility of emission caps, 
the allocation of permits and the need for a competitive market to facilitate trading, ii) price uncertainty, iii) the need 
for new financial regulations and administrative capacity, iv) tax implications, as well as v) the non-transparency of 
distributional incidence (National Treasury, 2010). 
 
 Firstly, with regard to the credibility of emission caps and the allocation of permits, the EU ETS permit 
allocations in first phase were greater than verified emissions, which were due to using emission 
projections before verifiable emissions data became available (Gilbertson & Reyes 2009). It was argued 
that if a cap-and-trade scheme is to work in South Africa, it will be critical for caps to be based on verified 
emissions data. The emissions data in Table 2, for the second phase of the EU ETS, indeed confirms the 
effectiveness of credible caps in reducing carbon emissions. 
 Secondly, with regard to price uncertainty, this is definitely a valid challenge as seen in EU ETS, where 
prices have moved significantly in response to new information regarding the allocation of allowances 
(Goldblatt, 2010b). The market structure in which permits are traded are equally important, as in South 
Africa there is a high concentration of emissions in the energy and fossils fuels sector that will create a 
challenge to the design of an emissions trading scheme in terms of addressing market power as well as 
ensuring trading liquidity (Goldblatt, 2010b). 
 Thirdly, in terms of the administration of an emission trading scheme, most installations in EU ETS chose 
between a method of calculation or continuous measurement, with the former being the practical choice 
(Brohe, 2010). Each member state in the EU ETS is also required to keep a national registry to ensure 
accurate accounting of all allowances under the Kyoto Protocol (Brohe, 2010). It is clear that any emissions 
trading scheme in South Africa will require additional administrative resources for both the government 
and firms alike. 
 Fourthly, the tax implications of cap-and-trade can be complicated, especially in the EU ETS, where there 
has been extensive grandfathering of emission rights (allocating them without charge) (IMF, 2008). Some 
experts argue that the grandfathered rights should be recorded as tax expenditure as a minimum, opening 
the issue up for public debate (IMF, 2008). This will present a valid challenge for South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) and NT if an emissions trading system were to be implemented in South Africa. 
 Fifthly, in respect of the challenge of distributional incidence, a study examining the welfare effect of 
emissions trading under oligopolistic trading conditions found that refunding 10% of the emission trading 
proceeds resulted in optimal welfare improvements where such proceeds are reinvested in renewable 
energy sources (Traber & Kemfert, 2010). In South Africa, the structure of the energy sector market is 
oligopolistic (National Treasury, 2010), and provided the proceeds from emissions trading are invested in 
renewable energy, the challenge may be addressed effectively. 
 
The effects of carbon tax on the competitiveness of industries are positive, and in addition, the carbon tax 
also increases fiscal revenue, although when replacing another tax, the results may be adverse to the fiscus. The 
effect of cap-and-trade schemes over the long term on industry is positive, with most EU ETS countries still 
experiencing positive GDP per capita growth at current prices over a five-year period of the EU ETS. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this article was to consider the effect of cap-and-trade and carbon tax schemes on 
sustainable development and to use this information in assessing the National Treasury’s decision to implement 
carbon tax in South Africa. In determining the impact of cap-and-trade and carbon tax on sustainable development, 
the distinguishing features between both instruments were highlighted. The primary difference is that carbon tax is a 
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pricing instrument offering certainty about price but uncertainty about the quantity of emission reductions, whereas 
a cap-and-trade scheme is a quantity instrument, offering certainty about the quantity of emission reduced but 
uncertainty about the carbon price. 
 
The studies evaluating the effect of carbon tax on greenhouse gas reduction confirm that the tax has the 
overall effect of reducing greenhouse gases. These results were obtained from both models predicting the impact of 
carbon tax on greenhouse gases as well as post-ex results of introducing a carbon tax. In respect of emissions 
trading, the first phase of the EU ETS showed no decrease in carbon emissions, which was primarily due to permit 
allocation being based on estimates of carbon emissions rather than verified emissions. However, the second phase 
of the EU ETS showed a material decline in carbon emissions with caps being based on verified emissions. On a 
whole, the impact of both market-based instruments on environmental and economically sustainable development is 
positive. The National Treasury’s reasons for not implementing cap-and-trade schemes were explained on the basis 
of a list of factors that were considered challenging within a South African context. These challenges included the 
credibility of emission cap, the allocation of permits, the need for a competitive market to facilitate trading, price 
uncertainty, tax implications, the need for new financial regulations and administrative capacity as well as the non-
transparency of distributional incidence. 
 
The significant challenges from a South African context remain a competitive market for trading, price 
uncertainty, tax implications and administrative capacity. The welfare effect may be positive provided the South 
African government reinvests proceeds from emissions trading in renewable energy. The credibility of the emission 
cap and allocation of permits can be addressed by using verifiable emissions as a basis for determining the 
quantitative limits of carbon emissions and allocating permits based on verifiable emissions rather than 
grandfathering permits. The decision by the Treasury on a whole is considered rational and acceptable from an 
economic and environmental perspective. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
A key limitation of the study is that it does not produce any new empirical insights nor does it necessarily 
validate any existing empirical insights. Notwithstanding this limitation, the article contribution can be seen in it 
contrasting evaluation of cap-and-trade schemes as opposed to carbon tax schemes, especially in the context of a 
developing economy such as South Africa. Although the study has led to theoretical insights regarding the 
relationship of carbon tax and cap-and-trade schemes on greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth, an 
empirical study will be necessary to validate the theoretical conclusions arrived at in the study. As far as future 
research opportunities regarding the impact of carbon tax and cap-and-trade schemes on economic and 
environmental sustainability, the following may be considered. The third phase of the EU ETS started in 2012 and 
should end in 2020. The level of allocated permits in the third phase is expected to be even smaller than in the 
second phase. The impact of a shortfall in permit allocations on carbon leakage, which occurs when there is an 
increase in carbon dioxide in one country as a result of an emissions reduction by a second country with a strict 
climate policy could be significant. The ability of multi-national companies operating in countries with stringent 
climate change policies to shift production processes to other countries with less stringent climate change policies 
and thereby nullify any emission reductions should be considered in determining the true effectiveness of the EU 
ETS in the third phase. 
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